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Cloud computing is a promising technology for the future of IT industry. Many 
organizations and companies are moving towards this technology. Cloud computing is a 
suitable solution for organizations and companies looking for saving money in IT and 
improving performance and availability. Cloud computing security is a big challenge for 
the provider of the cloud services and it is a big concern for the customers of these cloud 
services. Cloud computing has attractive features such as elasticity, auto scaling, and 
utility computing. These features could help the adopters maximize resource utilization 
and minimize their operating costs. However, if the attacker takes advantage of these 
features and launch a Distribute Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the cloud computing 
environment, this attack could change to a new attack, namely Economic Denial of 
Sustainability (EDoS) attack. The DDoS attack will trigger the elasticity and auto-scaling 
features on the cloud so the resources will grow according to the demand of the attack 
and due to the “pay as you go” model of the cloud, the adopters will be charged for the 
scaling of the resource until it reaches a point that it cannot sustain economically. The 
aim of this work is to study several existing mitigation techniques that prevent or mitigate 
the EDoS attack and state major drawbacks of the existing mitigation techniques. Then, a 
xiii 
 
new approach is proposed to mitigate the EDoS. This new mitigation technique takes into 
account most of the drawbacks for the existing mitigation techniques. The effectiveness 
of the proposed mitigation technique is evaluated using simulation. In addition, we 
conduct a comparison between our new approach and the EDoS-Shield technique. 
The proposed technique is based on reactive mitigation schemes and it has three phases. 
In the first phase, we are monitoring the auto-scaling feature and suspicion mode 
thresholds to detect if there is an EDoS attack. In the second phase, once an attack is 
detected, the cloud service will trigger the checking component by forwarding all 
requests to this component. This component is responsible for differentiating between 
legitimate users and automated attackers (Zombies). This component will differentiate 
the traffic by sending Graphic Turing Tests such as CAPTCHA to the request generator. 
In the third phase, the checking component will drop all traffic that cannot respond to the 
CAPTCHA. However, the checking component will forward all requests that pass the 
CAPTCHA validation to the cloud service. 
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 ﻣﻠﺧصﺹ  اﺍﻟرﺭﺳﺎﻟﺔ
  
  
  اﺍﻟﻛﺎفﻑ  نﻥﻋﺑدﺩ  اﺍﻟرﺭﺣﻣ  ﻣﺣﻣدﺩ  ﯾﻳﺣﯾﻳﻰ  ﻋﺑدﺩ  ﷲ :اﺍﻟﻛﺎﻣلﻝاﺍﻻﺳمﻡ  
  
  اﺍﻟﺣوﻭﺳﺑﺔ  اﺍﻟﺳﺣﺎﺑﯾﻳﺔﺗﻘﻧﯾﻳﺔ  ﻣﺣﺳﻧﺔ  ﻟﺗﺧﻔﯾﻳفﻑ  ھﮪﮬﻫﺟﻣﺎتﺕ  اﺍﻟﺣرﺭﻣﺎنﻥ  اﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدﺩيﻱ  ﻟﻼﺳﺗدﺩاﺍﻣﺔ  ﻓﻲ    :ﻋﻧوﻭاﺍنﻥ  اﺍﻟرﺭﺳﺎﻟﺔ
  
  ھﮪﮬﻫﻧدﺩﺳﺔ  ﺷﺑﻛﺎتﺕ  اﺍﻟﻛﻣﺑﯾﻳوﻭﺗرﺭ  اﺍﻟﺗﺧﺻصﺹ:
  
  3102دﺩﯾﻳﺳﻣﺑرﺭ    1  :ﺗﺎرﺭﯾﻳﺦ  اﺍﻟدﺩرﺭﺟﺔ  اﺍﻟﻌﻠﻣﯾﻳﺔ
  
اﺍﻟﺣوﻭﺳﺑﺔ  اﺍﻟﺳﺣﺎﺑﯾﻳﺔ  ھﮪﮬﻫﻲ  ﺗﻛﻧوﻭﻟوﻭﺟﯾﻳﺎ  وﻭاﺍﻋدﺩةﺓ  ﻟﻣﺳﺗﻘﺑلﻝ  ﺻﻧﺎﻋﺔ  ﺗﻛﻧوﻭﻟوﻭﺟﯾﻳﺎ  اﺍﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻭﻣﺎتﺕ.  اﺍﻟﻌدﺩﯾﻳدﺩ  ﻣنﻥ  اﺍﻟﻣﻧظﻅﻣﺎتﺕ  وﻭاﺍﻟﺷرﺭﻛﺎتﺕ  ﺗﺗﺟﮫﻪ  
ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺎتﺕ  اﺍﻷﻛﺎدﺩﯾﻳﻣﯾﻳﺔ  اﺍﻟﺗﻲ  ﺗﺑﺣثﺙ  ﻟﺗوﻭﻓﯾﻳرﺭ  اﺍﻟﻣﺎلﻝ  ﻧﺣوﻭ  ھﮪﮬﻫذﺫهﻩ  اﺍﻟﺗﻛﻧوﻭﻟوﻭﺟﯾﻳﺎ.  اﺍﻟﺣوﻭﺳﺑﺔ  اﺍﻟﺳﺣﺎﺑﯾﻳﺔ  ھﮪﮬﻫﻲ  اﺍﻟﺣلﻝ  اﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﺳبﺏ  ﻟﻠﻣؤﺅﺳﺳﺎتﺕ  وﻭاﺍﻟ
اﺍﻟﺧدﺩﻣﺎتﺕ.   أﺃﻣنﻥ  اﺍﻟﺣوﻭﺳﺑﺔ  اﺍﻟﺳﺣﺎﺑﯾﻳﺔ  ﯾﻳﺷﻛلﻝ  ﺗﺣدﺩﯾﻳﺎ   ﻛﺑﯾﻳرﺭاﺍ   ﻟﻣﻘدﺩمﻡ   ﻓﻲ  ﻣﺟﺎلﻝ  ﺗﻛﻧوﻭﻟوﻭﺟﯾﻳﺎ   اﺍﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻭﻣﺎتﺕ  وﻭﺗﺣﺳﯾﻳنﻥ  اﺍﻷدﺩاﺍء  وﻭاﺍﻟﺗوﻭاﺍﻓرﺭ
اﺍﻟﺧدﺩﻣﺎتﺕ  اﺍﻟﺳﺣﺎﺑﯾﻳﺔ  ﻓذﺫﻟكﻙ  ھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ  ﻣﺻدﺩرﺭ  ﻗﻠﻖ  ﻛﺑﯾﻳرﺭ  ﻟﻠﻌﻣﻼء  ھﮪﮬﻫذﺫهﻩ  اﺍﻟﺧدﺩﻣﺎتﺕ  اﺍﻟﺳﺣﺎﺑﯾﻳﺔ.  اﺍﻟﺣوﻭﺳﺑﺔ  اﺍﻟﺳﺣﺎﺑﯾﻳﺔ  ﻟدﺩﯾﻳﮭﻬﺎ  ﻣﻼﻣﺢ  ﺟذﺫاﺍﺑﺔ  
رﺭوﻭﻧﺔ،   اﺍﻟﺗوﻭﺳﻊ   اﺍﻟﺗﻠﻘﺎﺋﻲ،   وﻭاﺍﻟﺣوﻭﺳﺑﺔ   اﺍﻟﺧدﺩﻣﯾﻳﺔ.   ھﮪﮬﻫذﺫهﻩ   اﺍﻟﻣﯾﻳزﺯاﺍتﺕ  ﯾﻳﻣﻛنﻥ   أﺃنﻥ  ﺗﺳﺎﻋدﺩ   اﺍﻟﻣﺗﺑﻧﯾﻳنﻥ  ﺗﻌظﻅﯾﻳمﻡ   اﺍﺳﺗﺧدﺩاﺍمﻡ   اﺍﻟﻣوﻭاﺍرﺭدﺩ  ﻣﺛلﻝ   اﺍﻟﻣ
اﺍﻟﺣرﺭﻣﺎنﻥ  ﻣنﻥ    وﻭإﺇطﻁﻼقﻕ  ھﮪﮬﻫﺟوﻭمﻡوﻭﺗﻘﻠﯾﻳلﻝ  ﺗﻛﺎﻟﯾﻳفﻑ  اﺍﻟﺗﺷﻐﯾﻳلﻝ  اﺍﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ  ﺑﮭﻬمﻡ.  وﻭﻣﻊ  ذﺫﻟكﻙ،  إﺇذﺫاﺍ  ﻛﺎنﻥ  اﺍﻟﻣﮭﻬﺎﺟمﻡ  ﯾﻳﺳﺗﻔﯾﻳدﺩ  ﻣنﻥ  ھﮪﮬﻫذﺫهﻩ  اﺍﻟﻣﯾﻳزﺯةﺓ  
وﻭھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ   ھﮪﮬﻫﺟوﻭمﻡ   اﺍﻟﺣرﺭﻣﺎنﻥ    ﺟدﺩﯾﻳدﺩ،اﺍﻟﺧدﺩﻣﺔ   اﺍﻟﻣوﻭزﺯﻋﺔ   ﻋﻠﻰ   ﺑﯾﻳﺋﺔ   اﺍﻟﺣوﻭﺳﺑﺔ   اﺍﻟﺳﺣﺎﺑﯾﻳﺔ،   ﯾﻳﻣﻛنﻥ   ﺗﻐﯾﻳﯾﻳرﺭ   ھﮪﮬﻫذﺫاﺍ   اﺍﻟﮭﻬﺟوﻭمﻡ   إﺇﻟﻰ   ھﮪﮬﻫﺟوﻭمﻡ   
ﺳﺣﺎﺑﺔ  وﻭﺑﺎﻟﺗﺎﻟﻲ  اﺍﻟﻋﻠﻰ    وﻭاﺍﻟﺗوﻭﺳﻊ  اﺍﻟﺗﻠﻘﺎﺋﻲﻣرﺭوﻭﻧﺔ  ھﮪﮬﻫﺟوﻭمﻡ  اﺍﻟﺣرﺭﻣﺎنﻥ  ﻣنﻥ  اﺍﻟﺧدﺩﻣﺔ  اﺍﻟﻣوﻭزﺯﻋﺔ  ﯾﻳﺳﺗﮭﻬدﺩفﻑ  اﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدﺩيﻱ  ﻟﻼﺳﺗدﺩاﺍﻣﺔ.  
ﺟوﻭدﺩ   اﺍﻟﯾﻳﺔ   اﺍﻟدﺩﻓﻊ   ﻟﻼﺳﺗﺧدﺩاﺍمﻡ   ﻓﻲ   ﻧﻣوﻭذﺫجﺝ   اﺍﻟﺳﺣﺎﺑﺔ   ﻓﺎنﻥ   اﺍﻟﻣﺷﻐلﻝ  وﻭﺑوﻭ  اﺍﻟﻣﮭﻬﺎﺟمﻡﻓﺈنﻥ   اﺍﻟﻣوﻭاﺍرﺭدﺩ   ﺳوﻭفﻑ   ﺗﻧﻣوﻭ   وﻭﻓﻘﺎ   ﻟطﻁﻠبﺏ   ﻣنﻥ   
ﺑﻌدﺩھﮪﮬﻫﺎ  اﺍﻻﺳﺗﻣرﺭاﺍرﺭ  اﺍﻗﺗﺻﺎدﺩﯾﻳﺎ  ﺑﺳﺑبﺏ    ﻻ  ﯾﻳﻘدﺩرﺭﺳﯾﻳﺿطﻁرﺭ  اﺍﻟﻰ  دﺩﻓﻊ  ﻛلﻝ  اﺍﻟﺗﻛﺎﻟﯾﻳفﻑ  اﺍﻟﻧﺎﺗﺟﺔ  ﻋنﻥ  اﺍﻟﮭﻬﺟوﻭمﻡ  اﺍﻟﻰ  اﺍنﻥ  ﯾﻳﺻلﻝ  اﺍﻟﻰ  دﺩرﺭﺟﺔ  
رﺭﻣﺎنﻥ  اﺍﻟﺣ.  اﺍﻟﮭﻬدﺩفﻑ  ﻣنﻥ  ھﮪﮬﻫذﺫاﺍ  اﺍﻟﻌﻣلﻝ  ھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ  دﺩرﺭاﺍﺳﺔ  ﻋدﺩةﺓ  ﺗﻘﻧﯾﻳﺎتﺕ  اﺍﻟﺗﺧﻔﯾﻳفﻑ  اﺍﻟﻘﺎﺋﻣﺔ  اﺍﻟﺗﻲ  ﺗﻣﻧﻊ  أﺃوﻭ  ﺗﺧﻔفﻑ  ﻣنﻥ  ھﮪﮬﻫﺟوﻭمﻡ  اﺍﻟﺧﺳﺎرﺭةﺓ  اﺍﻟﻛﺑﯾﻳرﺭةﺓ
  ﻧﻘدﺩمﻡ  ﺗﻘﻧﯾﻳﺔ.  ﺛمﻡ،  ﺳوﻭفﻑ  اﺍﻟﻣوﻭﺟوﻭدﺩةﺓ  ﺣﺎﻟﯾﻳﺎﺗﻘﻧﯾﻳﺎتﺕ  اﺍﻟﺗﺧﻔﯾﻳفﻑ    اﺍﻟﻣوﻭﺟوﻭدﺩةﺓ  ﻓﻲ  ﻛلﻝ  اﺍﻟﺳﻠﺑﯾﻳﺎتﺕ  اﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدﺩيﻱ  ﻟﻼﺳﺗدﺩاﺍﻣﺔ  وﻭاﺍﻻﺳﺗﻔﺎدﺩةﺓ  ﻣنﻥ
اﺍﻻﻋﺗﺑﺎرﺭ  ﻣﻌظﻅمﻡ  ﻋﯾﻳنﻥ  ﺄﺧذﺫ   ﻓﻲ  ﺳﺗ.   ھﮪﮬﻫذﺫهﻩ   اﺍﻟﺗﻘﻧﯾﻳﺔ   اﺍﻟﺟدﺩﯾﻳدﺩةﺓ   اﺍﻟﺗﺧﻔﯾﻳفﻑ  ھﮪﮬﻫﺟوﻭمﻡ   اﺍﻟﺣرﺭﻣﺎنﻥ  اﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدﺩيﻱ  ﻟﻼﺳﺗدﺩاﺍﻣﺔﺟدﺩﯾﻳدﺩةﺓ   ﻟﺗﺧﻔﯾﻳفﻑ  
ﺎﻟﯾﻳﺔ  ﺗﻘﻧﯾﻳﺎتﺕ  اﺍﻟﺗﺧﻔﯾﻳفﻑ  اﺍﻟﻣﻘﺗرﺭﺣﺔ  ﺑﺎﺳﺗﺧدﺩاﺍمﻡ  اﺍﻟﻣﺣﺎﻛﺎةﺓ.  ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ  إﺇﻟﻰ  ذﺫﻟكﻙ،  ﻧﺣنﻥ  ﻋﯾﻳوﻭبﺏ  ﺗﻘﻧﯾﻳﺎتﺕ  اﺍﻟﺗﺧﻔﯾﻳفﻑ  اﺍﻟﻘﺎﺋﻣﺔ.  ﯾﻳﺗمﻡ  ﺗﻘﯾﻳﯾﻳمﻡ  ﻓﻌ
ﻟﺗﻘﯾﻳﯾﻳمﻡ   أﺃﺳﻠوﻭﺑﻧﺎ   ﺑﺷﺄنﻥ  دﺩرﺭعﻉ   ھﮪﮬﻫﺟوﻭمﻡ   اﺍﻟﺣرﺭﻣﺎنﻥ   اﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدﺩيﻱ  ﻟﻼﺳﺗدﺩاﺍﻣﺔ   ﻧﺧطﻁطﻁ   لﻝ   إﺇﺟرﺭاﺍء   ﻣﻘﺎرﺭﻧﺔ   ﺑﯾﻳنﻥ   ﻧﮭﻬﺟﻧﺎ   اﺍﻟﺟدﺩﯾﻳدﺩ   وﻭﺗﻘﻧﯾﻳﺔ   
  اﺍﻟﺗﻘﻧﯾﻳﺎتﺕ  اﺍﻟﻣوﻭﺟوﻭدﺩةﺓ.
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دﺩ   اﺍﻟﻔﻌلﻝ   وﻭﻟﮭﻬﺎ   ﺛﻼثﺙ  ﻣرﺭاﺍﺣلﻝ.   ﻓﻲ  اﺍﻟﻣرﺭﺣﻠﺔ   اﺍﻷوﻭﻟﻰ،   وﻭﻧﺣنﻥ  وﻭﺗﺳﺗﻧدﺩ   ھﮪﮬﻫذﺫهﻩ   اﺍﻟﺗﻘﻧﯾﻳﺔ   اﺍﻟﻣﻘﺗرﺭﺣﺔ   ﻋﻠﻰ  وﻭﺿﻊ  ﺧطﻁطﻁ   ﻟﺗﺧﻔﯾﻳفﻑ  رﺭ
.  ﻓﻲ  اﺍﻟﻣرﺭﺣﻠﺔ  اﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﯾﻳﺔ،  اﺍﻟﺣرﺭﻣﺎنﻥ  اﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدﺩيﻱ  ﻟﻼﺳﺗدﺩاﺍﻣﺔﻧرﺭاﺍﻗبﺏ  ﻣﯾﻳزﺯةﺓ  اﺍﻟﺗﺣﺟﯾﻳمﻡ  اﺍﻟﺗﻠﻘﺎﺋﻲ  ﻟﻠﻛﺷفﻑ  ﻋﻣﺎ   إﺇذﺫاﺍ   ﻛﺎنﻥ  ھﮪﮬﻫﻧﺎكﻙ  ھﮪﮬﻫﺟوﻭمﻡ  
ﺑﻣﺟرﺭدﺩ  اﺍﻛﺗﺷﺎفﻑ  ھﮪﮬﻫﺟوﻭمﻡ،  ﻓﺈنﻥ  ﺧدﺩﻣﺔ  ﺳﺣﺎﺑﺔ  ﺗﺣرﺭﯾﻳكﻙ  ﻋﻧﺻرﺭ  ﻓﺣصﺹ  ﻣنﻥ  ﻗﺑلﻝ  إﺇﺣﺎﻟﺔ  ﺟﻣﯾﻳﻊ  اﺍﻟطﻁﻠﺑﺎتﺕ  إﺇﻟﻰ  ھﮪﮬﻫذﺫاﺍ  اﺍﻟﻌﻧﺻرﺭ.  ھﮪﮬﻫذﺫاﺍ  
(،   وﻭھﮪﮬﻫذﺫاﺍ   ﻋﻧﺻرﺭ  seibmoZھﮪﮬﻫوﻭ   اﺍﻟﻣﺳؤﺅوﻭلﻝ   ﻋنﻥ   اﺍﻟﺗﻔرﺭﯾﻳﻖ   ﺑﯾﻳنﻥ   اﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﺧدﺩﻣﯾﻳنﻥ   اﺍﻟﺷرﺭﻋﯾﻳﯾﻳنﻥ   وﻭاﺍﻟﻣﮭﻬﺎﺟﻣﯾﻳنﻥ   اﺍﻵﻟﻲ   )اﺍﻟﻌﻧﺻرﺭ   
لﻝ   اﺍرﺭﺳﺎلﻝ   ﻛﺎﺑﺗﺷﺎ  ﻣﺛ  اﺍﺧﺗﺑﺎرﺭاﺍتﺕ   رﺭﺳمﻡ   ﺗوﻭرﺭﯾﻳﻧﺞاﺍﻟﺗﻔرﺭﯾﻳﻖ   ﺑﯾﻳنﻥ   ﺣرﺭﻛﺔ   اﺍﻟﻣرﺭوﻭرﺭ   ﻋنﻥ   طﻁرﺭﯾﻳﻖ   إﺇرﺭﺳﺎلﻝ   اﺍﻻﺧﺗﺑﺎرﺭاﺍتﺕ   اﺍﻟﺟرﺭاﺍﻓﯾﻳكﻙ   
اﺍﻟﻣرﺭوﻭرﺭ    اﺍوﻭ  طﻁﻠﺑﺎتﺕ  ﺈﺳﻘﺎطﻁ  ﺟﻣﯾﻳﻊ  ﺣرﺭﻛﺔﺑ  ﺳﯾﻳﻘوﻭمﻡ  ﻋﻧﺻرﺭ  اﺍﻟﺗﺣﻘﻖ.  ﻓﻲ  اﺍﻟﻣرﺭﺣﻠﺔ  اﺍﻟﺛﺎﻟﺛﺔ،  ﻟﻣرﺭﺳلﻝ  اﺍﻟطﻁﻠبﺏ  )AHCTPAC(
ﻛﺎﺑﺗﺷﺎ  اﺍﺳﺗﺟﺎﺑتﺕ  ﺑﻧﺟﺎحﺡ  ﻟﻠﺗوﻭﺟﯾﻳﮫﻪ  ﻛﺎﻓﺔ  اﺍﻟطﻁﻠﺑﺎتﺕ  اﺍﻟﺗﻲ  ﻋﻧﺻرﺭ  اﺍﻟﺗﺣﻘﻖ  ﺳﯾﻳﻘوﻭمﻡ  ﺑ  .)AHCTPAC(ﻠﻛﺎﺑﺗﺷﺎ  ﻟ  ﻟمﻡ  ﺗﺳﺗﺟبﺏاﺍﻟﺗﻲ  
إﺇﻟﻰ   اﺍﻟﺧدﺩﻣﺔ   اﺍﻟﺳﺣﺎﺑﯾﻳﺔ.
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1 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing technology is a result of urgent needs for low cost, high utilization, and 
efficient management of the available resources in the information technology industry. 
Cloud computing is a utility that provides services on demand. All services provided by 
the cloud are elastic and could be rented or released by the subscribers of these services 
via a web-based tool accessed via the Internet. These services are based on a model called 
“pay per use” model, which allows the clients or subscribers of the services to request 
resources on demand and pay only for their usage. The cloud computing services can be 
categorized based on the services delivered to the end users. These categories include the 
Infrastructure offered as a service (IaaS), Platform offered as a service (PaaS), and 
Software offered as a service (SaaS). There is another classification of cloud computing, 
which depends on the location and the services offered by the cloud. This classification is 
divided into public cloud, private cloud, hybrid cloud, and community cloud [1]. In 
addition, a private cloud consists of two types based on the location of the cloud and 
these are on premise private clouds and externally hosted private cloud (virtual private 
cloud) [1]. 
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According to a recent survey conducted by the International Data Corporation (IDC) [2], 
security is ranked first as the greatest challenge of cloud computing, as about 87% of IT 
executives cited security as the top challenge preventing their adoption of the cloud 
services model. Security concerns have led organizations to hesitate to move critical 
resources to the cloud. Corporations and individuals are often concerned about how 
security and compliance integrity can be maintained in this new environment. Also, 
moving critical applications and sensitive data to public and shared cloud environments is 
of  great  concern   for   corporations   since   their  data  center’s  network  boundary defense is 
not on hand. With security being one of the top concerns that hinders cloud computing 
[3]–[8] it has become a major field of study. 
The aspect of cloud computing security is wide and general. Therefore, it is imperative to 
introduce two types of network security threats, Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS). The DoS and the DDoS attacks overwhelm a network 
infrastructure or service by employing a distributed number of malicious or infected 
machines to perform unwanted operations intended to cause damage to the IT 
infrastructure of an organization. For example, a botnet (defined as a collection of 
malicious machines participating in an attack) is activated to overwhelm a web server, 
using an asynchronous attack that makes the site unavailable to end users, due to an 
exhaustion of its computing or network resources. 
Cloud computing allows us to scale our servers in magnitude and availability in order to 
provide service to a greater number of requests from end users. Moreover, adopters of the 
cloud service model are charged based on a pay-per-use  basis  of  the  cloud’s  server  and  
network resources, aka utility computing. Such a service model may appear to overcome 
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the effects of a DDoS attack, i.e., resource bottlenecks are eliminated. However, these 
clouds merely transform a conventional DDoS attack on server and network resources to 
a new breed of attacks that   target   the   cloud   adopter’s   economic   resource,   originally  
labeled as Economic Denial of Sustainability attack (EDoS) [9], [10]. Therefore, unlike 
conventional DDoS attacks, EDoS targets the financial constraint of an organization, but 
not its physical network or server constraints. EDoS occurs when zombie machines (part 
of a botnet) send a large amount of undesired traffic towards the cloud, exploiting the 
cloud's   elasticity,   to   chalk   up   an   exorbitant   amount   of   cost   on   a   cloud   adopter’s   bill,  
leading to large-scale service withdrawal or bankruptcy. In our work, we study several 
existing mitigation techniques that prevent or mitigate the EDoS attack and state all 
drawbacks of the existing mitigation techniques. Then, a new approach is proposed to 
mitigate the EDoS. This new mitigation technique takes into account most of the 
drawbacks of the existing mitigation techniques. 
The proposed technique is based on reactive mitigation schemes. In the first phase, we 
are monitoring the auto-scaling feature to detect if there is an EDoS attack. The 
monitoring parameters are based on the auto scaling parameters because EDoS tackles 
the auto-scaling feature. In this phase, we monitor the traffic bandwidth and the average 
CPU utilization using an upper level threshold and a lower level threshold in order to 
avoid the fluctuation around one value.  
In the second phase, once an attack is detected, the cloud service will trigger the checking 
component by forwarding all requests to this component. This component is responsible 
for differentiating between legitimate users and automated attackers (Zombies). This 
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component will differentiate the traffic by sending Graphic Turing Tests [11], such as 
CAPTCHA [12]–[15], to the request generator. 
In the third phase, the checking component will drop all traffic that cannot respond to the 
CAPTCHA. However, the checking component will forward all requests that pass the 
CAPTCHA validation to the cloud service. 
1.1 Background and Terminology  
Cloud computing is a technology model which is making a revolution in the computing 
environment. According to the official NIST definition [16], "cloud computing is a model 
for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications and 
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction.". 
Cloud computing is based on some existing technologies such as virtualization, utility 
computing, grid computing, and automatic computing. However, the virtualization 
technology is mainly form the foundation of cloud computing technology [17]. 
Virtualization is the responsible layer to pool the computing resources from the available 
hardware. It allocates and reallocates virtual resources based on demand [17]. 
There are four types of could computing based on the location and the services offered by 
the cloud; these types are private, public, hybrid, and community clouds. A public cloud 
is a cloud where the infrastructure layer is offered by a third party and shared between 
customers. In addition, the client has no control on the data, network, and security 
settings. A private cloud can be of two types, the first one is on premise private cloud, in 
5 
 
which the infrastructure layer is dedicated to a specific organization and not shared or 
common with other organizations. In addition, the organization has full control on data, 
network, and security settings. The second type of private cloud is an externally hosted 
private cloud (virtual private cloud), in which the infrastructure layer is used by one 
organization but offered by a third party. This totally hosted private cloud outside the 
organization is less costly than the on premise private cloud. 
A hybrid cloud is defined as a mixture of private and public clouds. The customer could 
host his critical applications on his private cloud and host non-critical applications on the 
public cloud. Also, this type of cloud computing is used for the infrastructure layer. For 
example, private computing infrastructure could be used for daily and normal activity. 
However, if there is a high activity in the network such as flash-crowd effect, then the 
computing infrastructure could be expanded by renting more resources from the public 
cloud infrastructure. Then, these resources may be released when not needed or the 
activity returns to normal. A community cloud is used to share the infrastructure layer 
between organizations or companies of the same community. For example, Ministries in 
Saudi Arabia could share the infrastructure layer on the cloud to get access to data related 
to citizens of Saudi Arabia. 
1.2 Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) 
The Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack is a major threat in the cloud-
computing environment. This attack is not only causing the service to be unavailable or 
down like a Denial of service (DoS) attack or Distributed Denial of service (DDoS) 
attack but also it is causing a tremendous economic loss. The EDoS takes advantage of 
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some attractive features in the cloud-computing environment such as elasticity, auto 
scaling, and pay as you go model. The main source of the EDoS attack is the DDoS 
attack targeting the cloud resources. Then, because of the elasticity and auto scaling 
features, the resources will grow according to the demand of the attack and due to the pay 
as you go model of the cloud, adopters will be charged for the scaling of the resource 
until it reaches a point that it cannot sustain economically [9], [10]. DDoS could prevent 
the legitimate users from accessing the service for a certain amount of time but EDoS 
could prevent the service provider from delivering the service forever if the attack leads 
to bankruptcy. 
The following scenarios illustrate the idea of the EDoS attack and the normal auto-
scaling feature. Scenario 1 illustrates the Auto Scaling concept on the cloud services and 
it is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Auto Scaling on the cloud Services 
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Auto scaling is one of the attractive features of a cloud-computing environment. This 
feature allocates automatically more instances or resources to handle the high load (scale 
up) and release automatically these resources when the load or traffic returns back to 
normal (scale down). The auto scaling could be activated by monitoring some parameters 
such as CPU utilization, Memory usage, response time, and network bandwidth. In 
scenario one, we illustrate the auto scaling feature activation, when more requests are 
coming to the cloud computing environment. In this case, the resources scale up and 
duplicate the servers to handle the high traffic. 
Scenario 2 illustrates the EDoS Attack targeting the cloud services and it is shown in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 EDoS Attack on the cloud Services 
 
In scenario two, the attacker launches a high number of requests to the cloud computing 
services, and then the servers scale up by the auto-scaling feature to handle this high 
traffic. Then, the adopter has to pay for all duplicated servers due to the pay-as-you-go 
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model. The cost for the adopter increases and economic loss occurs that it cannot be 
sustained economically. 
Our study in this thesis focuses on the evaluation of the EDoS attack on the SaaS cloud 
service such as a web application service, which could be considered as a single-class 
service. For most of the web applications, the number of client requests and the service 
rate are considered to be random variables having Poisson distribution [18], [19]. We are 
focusing on the EDoS attack targeting a single-class  service  where  all  cloud  customers’  
requests have the same processing procedure as it is in the web service that delivers 
content, such as web pages, using the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) over the 
Internet. Thus, considering a Poisson distribution for the service rate in our case is a valid 
assumption that also helps in simplifying our performance model. 
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2 CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Cloud computing security is one of the very important issues and some researchers have 
attempted to address it. They consider the DDoS and EDoS attacks as flooding attacks 
but due to the architectures of the cloud computing these attacks could increase the risk 
and the damage caused to the cloud computing systems. In this section, we discuss the 
related work including the security concern related to EDoS and the mitigation 
techniques that tackle the EDoS. In addition, we state the advantage and disadvantage of 
the existing mitigation techniques. 
Zhang et al. [17] provide a brief summary about some research challenges in cloud 
environments such as virtual machine migration, energy management, traffic 
management and analysis, automated service provisioning, data security, server 
consolidation, software frameworks, storage technology and data management, and novel 
cloud architectures. In this work, we tackle an important research challenge that is the 
security of the cloud. 
Cloud computing security is one of the very important issues and some researchers have 
attempted to address it. Hoff discussed the concept of transforming DDoS attack to EDoS 
in his blog in 2008 [9], [10].  Then, many researchers started investigating the EDoS 
attack and included this attack as a major threat and risk for the cloud-computing 
environment. The following works consider the EDoS attack as a security issue in cloud 
computing systems. 
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Khosravani et al. [20] considered the EDoS attack as one of the technical risk that target 
the adoption of the cloud. Shah et al. [21] proposed a detailed study of SaaS, PaaS, and 
IaaS in terms of security, privacy, and trust; and determines risk and their solution 
directives. They consider EDoS and DoS as IaaS medium risk. The European Network 
and Information Security Agency (ENISA) considers the EDoS attack as a high impact 
attack   in   their   report   “Cloud   Computing:   Benefits,   Risks   and   Recommendations for 
Information   Security”   [22]. The report stated the vulnerabilities that could cause the 
EDoS attack which are AAA vulnerabilities (authentication, authorization and accounting 
vulnerabilities), User provisioning vulnerabilities, User de-provisioning vulnerabilities, 
Remote access to management interface, and No policies for resource capping. In 
addition, the report stated that Company reputation, Customer trust, real time services, 
and Service delivery are affected assets by the EDoS attack [22]. Yu et al. [23] 
considered the EDoS attack as a new attack that targets the cloud platforms. They defined 
the EDoS attack as,   “where   a   large   number   of   bots   act   as   benign   clients   to enjoy the 
service  of  the  victim  to  financially  bankrupt  a  cloud  customer  using  the  “pay-as-you-use”  
billing mechanism”.  Lemoudden  et  al.  [24] described how a traditional DoS attack could 
affect the cloud services and reach a complicated, resourcefully demanding premeditated 
goal. Sudha et al. [5] listed the EDoS attack as an application level attack that could 
overcome the cloud service budget and increase the cloud utility bill. Therefore, they 
considered this attack to create huge impact on the companies’   economic resources. 
Buyya et al. [25] proposed innovative management techniques to support SaaS layer 
applications and conceptual architecture of autonomic management of Clouds. This 
conceptual architecture has security and attack detection component, which is responsible 
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for differentiating between legitimate requests and DDoS attack requests. The main 
objective of this component is avoiding unnecessary waste of energy and budget due to 
dynamic provision of resources for attack requests. The authors [25] considered the DoS 
attack as a critical security threat because of dynamic provision resources that allocate 
more resources for the incoming requests whether it is legitimate request or an attack 
request. This allocating of unnecessary resources could increase the cost for the providers 
and increase the energy waste. Yu et al. [26] divided the DDoS targeting the cloud 
environment into two attacks based on the resource provisioning plans that are provided 
by the Cloud Service Provider. The first attack is the EDoS attack targeting the cloud 
when the resource-provisioning plan is a short-term on-demand one. The second attack is 
the traditional DDoS attack when the resource-provisioning plan is a long-term 
reservation. Xiao et al. [27] presented the potential vulnerabilities in the cloud-computing 
environment that may be exploited by the attackers. They consider the EDoS attack as a 
vulnerability of the cloud-pricing model. They stated that the EDoS attack needs more 
investigation and study [27]. 
In addition, there are many other works that consider and count the EDoS attack as a real 
threat for the cloud computing environment [28]–[30]. 
Reddy et al. [31] connect the security concerns and issues to the several service 
architecture levels of the cloud computing. They considered security of client data and 
information as the most important requirement for any services provided by any cloud-
computing environment. They classify the security concerns and issues based on 
Software as a service (SaaS), Platform as a service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a service 
(IaaS). They describe the flooding attacks and their effect on the cloud-computing 
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platform. They consider a DoS attack as one of the flooding attacks that target the 
infrastructure of the cloud-computing platform. They also state that the risk of a DoS 
attack increases when it targets a cloud computing platform, due to the shared resources 
as a result of the virtualization feature of the cloud computing. This type of flooding 
attacks could cause an Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack. In our work, we 
concentrate on the application level security and the EDoS attack is a major concern. 
Therefore, we propose a new mitigation technique, for the EDoS, namely the EDoS 
Attack Defender. 
Modi et al. [32] surveyed the intrusion detection techniques that can be used in a cloud 
computing environment. They stated many types of attacks that target the cloud-
computing environment. They describe the flooding attack and how this attack could 
raise the usage bills drastically as the cloud would not be able to distinguish between the 
normal usage and fake usage. They described the EDoS attacks and they claimed that 
some of the proposed mitigation techniques are not efficient since they only use 
traditional firewalls because firewalls cannot distinguish good traffic from DoS attack 
traffic. In addition, they state that research is still needed to detect an EDoS attack in the 
cloud. In this work, we focus on the EDoS attack due to its high impact on the cloud-
computing environment. We propose a new mitigation technique for the EDoS attacks, 
namely the EDoS Attack Defender. 
Khor et al. [33] proposed an On-Demand Cloud-based EDoS Mitigation Mechanism 
named Self-verifying Proof of Work (sPoW). This mitigation technique is supposed to 
handle the EDoS attack before it triggers the billing mechanism. They introduced an 
asymmetric step before committing the server's resources. The server requires a proof of 
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work from the client, before committing its resources to the client. Clients expend their 
resources  to  solve  a  “crypto-puzzle”  and  submit  a  proof  of  the  solution  as  an  embedded  
signal (capability) within the packets. A server has to generate   a   “crypto-puzzle”   to  
protect the connection server channel. A crypto-puzzle consists of both the encryption of 
channel information (such as IP address and port number) and the concealed encryption 
key with k bits representing the puzzle difficulty. A puzzle requester running on the 
client-side expands the client resources by brute forcing these k bits to discover the server 
channel information where it can submit an initial connection request. It prioritizes the 
legitimate traffic based on the difficulty of the puzzle. This mitigation technique has 
some weaknesses regarding the puzzle, requiring a computation power from the clients to 
solve the puzzles and from the server to generate the puzzles especially in case of 
difficult puzzles. In addition, it could lead to a puzzle attack if the attacker responds with 
high difficult unsolved puzzles to the server. In our work, we avoid requiring a proof of 
work from the clients when they ask for cloud resources, and only check whether the 
clients are humans by sending CAPTCHA if the demand of resources exceeds a pre-
defined threshold. 
Sqalli et al. [34] proposed a new mitigation technique against EDoS attacks in cloud 
computing, namely EDoS-Shield. The EDoS-Shield architecture consists of two main 
components. The first component is a virtual firewall (VF) and it works as a filter 
mechanism based on white and black lists that hold IP addresses of the originating 
clients. The second component is a verifier cloud node (V-Node) and it uses the graphic 
Turing tests such as CAPTCHA to verify legitimate requests. Then, it updates the 
whitelist and blacklist based on the results of the verification process. This technique is 
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based on the IP address and it does not consider IP spoofing. The authors of this paper 
improved the EDoS-Shield and proposed an Enhanced EDoS-Shield that takes into 
account the Spoofed IP Addresses [35]. This technique adds a Time to Live (TTL) value 
of the packet’s  IP  header  and  a  counter  of  unmatched  TTL  values  to  the  white  and  black  
lists to distinguish whether the packet is having a spoofed IP address. In addition, it adds 
the attack start time in the blacklist. This work includes results obtained from a discrete 
event simulation model. These results show that this technique is an effective approach to 
mitigate EDoS attacks originating from spoofed IP addresses and outperforms the 
original EDoS-Shield. These results include performance and cost metrics. 
These two mitigation techniques, EDoS-Shield and Enhanced EDoS-Shield, are based on 
the IP addresses lists approach that has many drawbacks such as blocking an entire NAT 
network if one of the public IP address is caught as an attacker and added to the black 
list. In addition, cloud services are accessible from everywhere, so it is difficult to 
recognize clients fingerprint and their TTL values; and some attack tools that could 
change the value of TTL so this value is not always correct. Finally, the EDoS-Shield 
adds overhead on the firewall to check the IP address of each request and the enhanced 
EDoS-Shield adds extra overhead on the firewall to check the IP address and its TTL 
value of each request. Then, these values are compared with blacklist and whitelist 
values. In our work, we avoid blocking the attack using IP addresses and only redirect the 
request if the auto-scaling feature and suspicion thresholds are triggered. In addition, no 
overhead on the firewall is added to check the IP address or the TTL values of the request 
for the purpose of comparing these values with blacklist and whitelist values. 
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VivinSandar et al. [36] explained the EDoS attack as a new breed of DDoS attacks and as 
one of the cloud specific attacks. They summarized the countermeasures of some 
approaches that tried to address the EDoS attack. The authors proposed a new protection 
technique for the EDoS attack. They conducted some experiments on AWS Amazon 
public cloud [37]. They concluded that their proposed protection technique will not 
eliminate completely the EDoS attack and more research is needed to prevent and 
mitigate the EDoS attack. 
Kumar et al. [38] discussed and described the Economic Distributed Denial of 
Sustainability (EDDoS) in cloud computing. They proposed a mitigation technique for 
EDDoS attack. This mitigation technique consists of three modules, Packet filtering, 
Proof-of-work technique, and Egress filtering to avoid EDDoS attacks to the cloud. The 
authors focused on building an effective crypto puzzle [39], but this puzzle adds a 
computation overhead on the client side. In addition, in the cloud-computing 
environment, there are varieties of clients such as mobile clients, tablet clients, etc. These 
clients cannot handle the computation overhead to solve the crypto puzzle in order to gain 
access to cloud services. In addition, Gligor [40] stated that the client puzzles used as a 
proof of work are ineffective and unnecessary, as they impose a high overhead on 
legitimate client requests and only offer very weak guarantees. 
Kumar et al. [41] proposed an EDDoS mitigation technique named Scrubber Service. 
This technique is used on-demand and is charged according to pay per use basis. This 
Scrubber service is responsible for the puzzle generation and verification, so there is no 
overhead on the cloud service. The proposed mitigation technique has two modes; the 
first one is the normal mode when the activity is normal on the cloud services. The 
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second one is the suspected mode when the activity is high on the cloud services. The 
change between these two modes depends on two threshold limits, resource consumption, 
and bandwidth consumption. The cloud services will forward all requests to the Scrubber 
service if it is in the suspected mode, so the scrubber can send a crypto puzzle to the 
client in order to prove its legitimacy for acquiring the service. The proposed mitigation 
has some limitations such as the disadvantage of the crypto puzzles that we mentioned 
earlier [40] and the threshold limits. The change of the modes could occur frequently by 
exceeding and returning under the threshold limit. The system could become unstable due 
to a fluctuation in the traffic activity around the threshold limit frequently. 
Alosaimi et al. [42] proposed a new mitigation technique to encounter EDoS attack in a 
new cloud environment. This environment is where “Bring  Your  Own  Device”  (BYOD) 
policies in enterprises are defined. The attack is targeting the Identity and Access 
Management (IAM) vulnerabilities in the BYOD implementation in the organizations to 
gain access to the internal resources of the organizations and launch an EDoS attack. This 
attack is taking advantage of the missing of resource control and management of 
platforms of the BYOD devices. This attack could cause Direct DDoS to the organization 
itself or cause Indirect DDoS to other organizations that use the same cloud service 
provider. Their mitigation technique is called DDoS- Mitigation System (DDoS-MS). It 
investigates only two packets from the source of the request by using two types of testing, 
the Graphic Turning Test (GTT) and Crypto Puzzles. The two types of testing are used to 
authenticate the user and the packet. In addition, this technique is using the black and 
white lists based on IP addresses to control the access to the cloud services. 
17 
 
Alosaimi and Al-Begain [42] proposed an enhanced DDoS Mitigation technique that is 
an improvement of the previous mitigation technique [43]. The enhanced DDoS-MS is 
only investigating the first packet by using Graphic Turning Test (GTT). The enhanced 
DDoS-MS consists of a virtual firewall, a verifier node(s), a client puzzle server, an 
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) device, and a Reverse proxy (RP) server. The virtual 
firewall has four different lists, the black list, the white list, the suspicious list, and the 
malicious list. The Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) is used to investigate the packet’s  
content for malicious content such as malware. The Reverse proxy (RP) server is 
responsible for hiding the locations of cloud servers and balancing the load between these 
servers. In addition, it monitors the rate of traffic to detect the DDoS attacks. The client 
puzzle server is used as a reactive step to delay the requests of a user who tries to 
overwhelm the system. 
These two mitigation techniques, DDoS-MS and Enhanced DDoS-MS, are based on an 
IP addresses lists approach that has many drawbacks such as blocking an entire NAT 
network if one of the public IP addresses is caught as an attacker and added to the black 
list. In addition, cloud services are accessible from everywhere, so it is difficult to 
recognize clients fingerprint and their TTL values; and some attack tools could change 
the value of TTL so this value is not always correct. In addition, they used the puzzle 
server that has many drawbacks discussed earlier. Finally, these two mitigation 
techniques add a huge overhead on the system because of their filters and lists. In our 
work, to make the system reliable and simple, we avoid blocking the attack using any list 
and only redirect the request if the auto-scaling feature and suspicion thresholds are 
triggered. 
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Since the DDoS attack is the main source of EDoS attack, we focus on the DDoS attacks 
on cloud computing environments and we discuss existing DDoS mitigation techniques. 
These techniques could help us improve the mitigation techniques for EDoS attacks. 
According to the security report from NSFOCUS, 93.2% of the DDoS attacks in 2013 
last for less than 30 minutes, similar to what was observed in 2012. In addition, the most 
popular methods that are used for attacking are TCP Flood and HTTP Flood, so the focus 
is on the application layer attack because it is less expensive and cause higher damage. 
“A typical application layer attack like HTTP Flood is popular among hackers because it 
specifically targets the consumption of CPU/storage/database resources, which can shut 
down  a  victim’s  website  without  generating  a  large  amount  of  network  traffic.  That  being  
said, the traditional TCP Flood and UDP Flood will not disappear either, since they are 
still the most effective attacks against victims that are not protected by dedicated anti-
DDoS mitigation  equipment  or   service” [44], [45]. In our work, we concentrate on the 
application layer attacks and our proposed mitigation technique is based on the reactive 
mitigation strategy because most attacks last for a short time.  
Chen et al. [46] surveyed the existing virtualization technologies, the benefits and 
advantages of implementing virtualization, and stated the security vulnerabilities of using 
virtualization. In addition, they presented two case studies, the first one is XEN 
hypervisor security analysis, and the second one is VMware hypervisor security analysis. 
The authors stated that the VMware VM and XEN are suffering from the DoS attack as 
one of the security issues [46]. Since the virtualization technology is the key feature of 
the cloud computing environment, then all security issues related to virtualization could 
affect the security of the cloud-computing environment.  
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Shea et al. [47] proposed a study of the impact of a DoS attack on four types of virtual 
machines (VMs). These virtual machines (VMs) are KVM, Xen, Open VZ, and Vanilla. 
The authors launched two types of attacks on the VMs, the first one is TCP DoS, and the 
second one is UDP flood. The authors described the degradation of performance of these 
VMs under attacks [47]. The combination of virtualization overhead and performance 
degradation in a DoS attack can lead to a 50% decrease in Web Server performance when 
compared to the non-virtualized Vanilla system using the same amount of resources. 
They stated that modern virtualization is more vulnerable under TCP SYN DoS attack. 
They stated that SYN-cookies and SYN-caches do not provide adequate protection for 
VMs. The DoS attack on these virtual machines could change to Economic Denial of 
Sustainability attack under the cloud-computing environment with auto scaling feature 
enabled. 
The BitBucket is a code hosting web service offered by the public cloud Amazon [37]. 
This service was unavailable for more than 19 hours due to a DDoS attack; so many 
developers could not access their code projects hosted on the BitBucket. The attack is a 
massive-scale DDoS that contains massive flood of UDP packets coming into an Amazon 
IP, eating away all bandwidth. Amazon blocked the offending traffic, and service 
returned to normal after at least 16 hours from the time it was first reported. However, by 
the next morning, the problem returned, and another two hours passed before this second 
outage was reversed. The second attack used a flood of TCP SYN connection requests, 
rather than UDP packets [48]. 
Karnwal et al. [49] proposed a mitigation technique called filtering tree for the DoS 
attacks. They focus on REST, HTTP, and XML based DoS attacks because the cloud 
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computing users make their requests in XML then send these requests using HTTP 
protocol and build their system interface with REST protocol such as Amazon EC2 or 
Microsoft Azure. This technique acts as a service broker combined within a SOA model. 
This service converts the client requests in XML tree form and uses a virtual Cloud 
defender and its filters to investigate the client requests. The proposed architecture 
consists of three parts; the first part is named Embed SOAP Message, and is responsible 
for detecting a coercive parsing attack using SOAP signatures. The second part is named 
IP Trace-Back, and it is an IP address blacklist containing the blocked IP address 
(provided by the virtual Cloud defender). In addition, the third part is named virtual 
Cloud defender. The virtual Cloud defender contains five filters. The Sensor Filter 
monitors the high traffic and marks it as suspicious. The HOP Count Filter compares the 
Hop count of incoming traffic with the stored Hop Count value and if it does not match, 
then those messages are marked as having suspicious IP addresses. The IP Frequency 
Divergence detects the same frequency of IP messages and marks those messages as 
having suspicious IP addresses. The Puzzle Resolver Filter sends a puzzle to all 
suspicious IPs from previous filters, and if the suspicious IP address sends the correctly 
solved puzzle to the puzzle-resolver, then it means it is a legitimate client; otherwise, the 
puzzle resolver drops the request message and sends the suspicious IP address to the IP 
Trace-Back. Finally, the Double Signature Filter checks the xml message for open tag 
and drops the message if found, otherwise it sends the request to the cloud service. This 
mitigation technique has a large overhead due to the number of filters that the request 
must go through. In addition, this technique is based on the IP list and puzzle 
mechanisms and for which we have already stated the drawbacks. 
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As a summary, more investigation and exploration are needed to address many research 
challenges in the security of the cloud computing. The Economic Denial of Sustainability 
(EDoS) attack is a serious threat to the cloud computing environment due to its impacts 
on the economic side. I explored the exiting mitigation techniques for the EDoS attack, 
but these techniques are not sufficient to prevent the cloud computing environment from 
the EDoS attack. These mitigation techniques suffer from many drawbacks such as using 
IP address lists to block the attacker, using a puzzle to prove that the client commits to 
the resources, using firewalls   or   filters   to   process   all   the   clients’   requests   causing   an  
overhead. In our work, the cloud computing environment is operating in normal mode 
with no need to process the client requests. However, if the auto-scaling feature and the 
suspicion thresholds are triggered, then the cloud computing environment operates in the 
suspicious mode and redirects the client request to the EDoS Attack Defender. The EDoS 
Attack Defender will differentiate between legitimate users and automated attackers 
(Zombies). This component will differentiate between the traffic by sending Graphic 
Turing Tests [11], such as CAPTCHA [12]–[15], to the request generator. If the request 
generator could respond to the CAPTCHA, then it will be considered by the EDoS Attack 
Defender as a legitimate user, and its request will be directed to the cloud computing 
service. On the other hand, if the request generator could not respond to the CAPTCHA, 
then it will be considered by the EDoS Attack Defender as an automated attacker 
(Zombie) and its request will be blocked.  
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3 CHAPTER 3 
EDoS ATTACK DEFENDER MITIGATION TECHNIQUE 
In this chapter, we propose a novel solution, namely EDoS Attack Defender, to mitigate 
the Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack in the cloud computing platforms. 
We design a discrete simulation experiment to evaluate its performance and cost metrics 
of this mitigation technique. 
Cloud computing has an attractive feature namely auto-scaling. This feature allows for 
allocating new instances for the purpose of handling the increased demands on the 
services and releasing some existing instances when these demands decrease. Auto 
scaling is an automatic feature with minimal management effort. Auto scaling is triggered 
based on some parameters and thresholds. The cloud computing platform administrator 
based on the services that are provided chooses these parameters and thresholds. The 
administrator could select the average CPU utilization, memory, or response time as the 
auto scaling parameter with predefined threshold based on the specific application. The 
additional resources that are allocated are charged to the adopters of the cloud computing 
by “pay-as-you-use”  model or utility computing. Therefore, the DDoS attack problem 
could create a huge financial impact when targeting the cloud computing environment. 
This new type of attack, namely Economic Denial of Suitability (EDoS) could drag the 
cloud adopter to a point that it could not pay the bill and could not sustain economically. 
The main idea of the EDoS Attack Defender is to verify whether the requests are coming 
from legitimate users or generated by compromised machines (Zombies). Most of the 
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existing mitigating techniques are using filtering mechanisms that generate high overhead 
on the system or are using classifying techniques that use some parameters to classify the 
incoming requests, but that could block legitimate users or allow attack traffic. Unlike 
these mitigation techniques, the EDoS Attack Defender is only activated under suspicions 
conditions and starts investigating the traffic to distinguish between legitimate and attack 
traffic, and then only allows the legitimate users and drops all attack traffic. 
DDoS is one of the major threats to many systems. DDoS is the main source of the EDoS 
attack. Therefore, we should get the benefit of all research and finding for the DDoS 
attack. The main scheme to prevent or mitigate the DDoS attacks is divided into two 
mitigation schemes. The first scheme is a reactive mitigation technique that has three 
phases. The first phase consists of distributed components to monitor the system for 
detecting any DDoS attacks. The second phase is triggered only if the first phase detected 
an on-going DDoS attack and it tries to locate the attack source. In the third phase, the 
DDoS attack is mitigated by deploying countermeasures. The second scheme is a 
proactive mitigation technique that takes appropriate actions and investigations before the 
attack hits the system [41], [50].  
Our proposed technique is the EDoS Attack Defender and it is based on reactive 
mitigation schemes. The EDoS Attack Defender consists of three phases. In the first 
phase, we are monitoring the auto-scaling feature threshold to detect if there is an EDoS 
attack. The monitoring parameters are based on the auto-scaling parameters because the 
EDoS attack tackles the auto-scaling feature. In this phase, we monitor the average CPU 
utilization using an upper level threshold and a lower level threshold in order to avoid the 
first unnecessary auto scaling under the attack.  
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In the second phase, once an attack is detected, the cloud service will trigger the EDoS 
Attack Defender by forwarding all new requests to this component. The EDoS Attack 
Defender is responsible for differentiating between legitimate users and automated 
attackers (Zombies). This component will differentiate the traffic by sending Graphic 
Turing Tests [11], such as CAPTCHA [12]–[15], to the request generator. 
In the third phase, the EDoS Attack Defender will drop all traffic that cannot respond to 
the CAPTCHA. However, the EDoS Attack Defender will forward all requests that pass 
the CAPCHA validation to the cloud service. 
The EDoS Attack Defender mitigation technique consists of two components, cloud 
service and EDoS Attack Defender see Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 EDoS Attack Defender Components 
 
The EDoS Attack Defender mitigation technique has four modes; Normal Mode, 
Suspicions Mode, Flash Crowd Mode, and Attack Mode see Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 EDoS Attack Defender Modes 
Since the EDoS attack is targeting the auto-scaling feature, we are also using the auto-
scaling feature to detect the attack, and then prevent or mitigate this attack. In this 
mitigation technique, we have defined three thresholds, baseline utilization, the upper 
level utilization, and lower level utilization. The value of the baseline utilization is 
retrieved from the system historical behavior on an infrequent basis to track the system 
behavior. 
The upper and lower utilization thresholds are defined based on the auto-scaling 
utilization threshold and baseline utilization. For example, if the auto-scaling utilization 
threshold is 80% then the upper level utilization threshold is 80%. The lower level 
utilization threshold is equal to the upper level utilization threshold minus 10%, which is 
70%, in case the baseline utilization is less than 70%, otherwise the lower level utilization 
threshold will be equal to the baseline utilization. The upper and lower utilization 
thresholds are used to determine the suspicion mode region (See Figure 5). 
EDoS Attack Defender Modes 
Suspicious 
Mode
Attack Mode Flash Crowd Mode
Normal 
Mode
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Figure 5 EDoS Attack Defender, Suspicion Mode Thresholds 
 
In addition, we have defined a timer named the Attack Period Timer. This timer is used 
with the baseline utilization to state if the attack finished, by calculating the legitimate 
response percentage in this period.    
The cloud service will start operating normally in the Normal Mode (No overhead or 
checking in this mode). We consider the cloud computing environment in the normal 
mode if the current system utilization is below the lower level utilization threshold, and 
the cloud services respond to the client requests as shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 Normal Mode 
 
The cloud service will monitor the lower and upper level utilization thresholds and if the 
system current utilization is inside the suspicion mode region, then the mode will change 
to Suspicious Mode. For example, if the lower and upper level utilization thresholds are 
70% and 80% respectively, then the cloud service will change to Suspicious Mode if the 
system utilization value is between 70% and 80%.  
In Suspicious Mode, all new incoming requests are forward directly to the EDoS Attack 
Defender component to check if it is a Flash Crowd Mode or Attack Mode. Then, the 
EDoS Attack Defender will differentiate between legitimate users and automated 
attackers (Zombies) by sending CAPTCHA to the request generator. After that, the EDoS 
Attack Defender will drop the request in case of a failure in responding to the 
CAPTCHA, and consider the request generator as an attacker as shown in Figure 7. 
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The EDoS Attack Defender will redirect the request to the cloud service in case of a 
success in responding to the CAPTCHA, and consider the request generator as a 
legitimate user. Then, the cloud services will respond to the client request as shown in 
Figure 8. 
The EDoS Attack Defender component will keep sending CAPTCHA to all new 
incoming requests and record the number of legitimate responses to the CAPTCHA. 
Then, when the current system utilization is out of the suspicion region (above the upper 
level utilization or below the lower level utilization), we will calculate the percentage of 
legitimate responses by dividing the number of legitimate responses over the total 
number of requests. If this value is greater than 90%, then it is a Flash Crowd Mode; and 
if it is below 90%, then it is Attack Mode. We have chosen 90% as the success rate of the 
CAPTCHA to mimic the real life when some legitimate users (10%) could not solve the 
CAPTCHA for some reason. In addition, there are many types of CAPTCHA that are 
deployed with different success rates. For example, the reCAPTCHA [51] has an overall 
success rate of 96.1% based on more than 1 billion responses. However, this success rate 
is in the range of 92.6-96.9% for users of a native language that is not English [51]. 
Therefore, we select 90% to include all users. However, we could change this percentage 
based on the CAPTCHA type selected. 
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Figure 7 Suspicious and Attack Mode, Attacker Case 
 
Figure 8 Suspicious and Attack Mode, Legitimate User Case 
 
In the Flash Crowd Mode, the requests will be served directly from the cloud service as 
in the Normal Mode. 
In the Attack Mode, the EDoS Attack Defender will continue to send the CAPTCHA to 
the Request Originator and record the number of legitimate responses. 
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The EDoS Attack Defender will drop all traffic that cannot respond to the CAPTCHA. 
However, the EDoS Attack Defender will forward all requests that pass the CAPTCHA 
validation to the cloud service. 
The EDoS Attack Defender will keep sending CAPTCHA to all new incoming traffic 
until the system’s current utilization is equal or smaller than the baseline utilization. 
Then, the EDoS Attack Defender will send the CAPCHA for a certain amount of time 
based on the Attack Period Timer; and after that, we would calculate the percentage of 
legitimate responses by dividing the number of the legitimate responses over the total 
number of requests in this period. If this value is greater than 90%, then the system 
returns back to the Normal Mode, and otherwise it stays in the Attack Mode.  
3.1 Proposed Architecture and Algorithms 
The following flowcharts of Figure 9 and Figure 10 describe the cloud service and EDoS 
Attack Defender components behavior. 
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Figure 9 Cloud Service Component Flowchart  
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Figure 10 EDoS Defender Component Flowchart 
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Algorithm 3.1 describes the actions at the cloud service when receiving a request. At the 
cloud service, the actual platform is kept simple with negligible overhead and without 
major modification. A request will be forwarded directly to the cloud services instances if 
the current mode is Normal Mode or Flash Crowd Mode. Otherwise, the request will be 
forwarded to the EDoS Attack Defender for further investigation. After that, we will 
check if the system utilization is between the suspicion mode thresholds, then the current 
mode will change to Suspicious Mode. 
 
Algorithm 3.1:  Cloud Service  
Input: 
     R   Request 
     CM  Cloud Mode (Current Mode) 
     NM  Normal Mode 
     SM  Suspicious Mode 
     FCM  Flash Crowd Mode  
     AM  Attack Mode 
     SU  System Utilization  
     SMT Suspicion Mode Thresholds 
      
Begin: 
   CMÅNM 
   Define SMT 
While(New request from cloud service) { 
   If ( M == NM || M == FCM  )  
      { 
       Forward R to Cloud Services 
         If (  SU  є  SMT    )   
             CMÅSM 
      } 
   Else  
    Forward R to EDoS Attack Defender 
}//END While 
    End 
 
 
  
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
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Algorithm 3.2 describes the actions at the EDoS Attack Defender when receiving a 
request from the cloud service for further investigation. At the EDoS Attack Defender, 
we will differentiate between Attack Mode and Flash Crowd Mode by sending 
CAPTCHA to all new incoming requests. The EDoS Attack Defender will drop the 
request in case of a failure in responding to the CAPTCHA and consider the request 
generator as an attacker. However, the EDoS Attack Defender will redirect the request to 
the cloud service in case of a success in responding to the CAPTCHA and consider the 
request generator as a legitimate user. Then, the cloud services will respond and serve the 
client request. In addition, it will check if the attack has finished by using the attack 
period timer and the percentage of the legitimate response to the CAPTCHA. 
Algorithm 3.2:  EDoS Attack Defender  
Input: 
     R   Request 
     RS  Request Sender 
     CM  Cloud Mode (Current Mode) 
     NM  Normal Mode 
     SM  Suspicious Mode 
     FCM  Flash Crowd Mode  
     AM  Attack Mode 
     SU  System Utilization  
     SMT Suspicion Mode Thresholds 
     BU  Baseline Utilization 
     APT  Attack Period Timer 
     TRC  Total Request Counter 
     LRC  Legitimate Request Counter 
Begin: 
   Read BU 
   TRC=0,LRC=0 
While(New request from cloud service) { 
   TRC++      
   Send to RS a graphic Turing test 
   If (Turing test passes) { 
        LRC++  
        Forward R to Cloud Services 
      } 
   Else  
        Drop R 
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
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If (CM == AM) //Attack Mode 
      If ( SU <= BU ) { 
        If ( APT run out ) 
          If ( LRC/TRC >= 90% ) { 
           CMÅNM 
           return 
            } 
          Else 
           return 
       } 
Else //Suspicious Mode { 
      If ( SU  SMT  )  
        If ( LRC/TRC >= 90% )  { 
         CMÅFCM 
         return 
          } 
        Else  {  
         CMÅAM 
         return 
          } 
   } 
}//END While 
 
END 
 
 
Our proposed mitigation technique will be compared to the EDoS-Shield technique. The 
EDoS-shield is one of the mitigation techniques that are designed to prevent and mitigate 
the EDoS attacks. The EDoS-Shield architecture consists of two main components. The 
first component is a Virtual Firewall (VF) and it works as a filter mechanism based on a 
whitelist and a blacklist that hold IP addresses of the originating clients. The second 
component is a Verifier Cloud Node (V-Node) and it uses the graphic Turing tests such 
as CAPTCHA to verify legitimate requests. Then, it updates the whitelist and blacklist 
based on the results of the verification process [34], [35].  
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Figure 11 the EDoS-Shield Architecture [34] 
Our proposed mitigation technique, the EDoS Attack Defender, will be triggered only if 
the auto-scaling feature is activated, instead of monitoring all incoming traffic and 
classifying it into a blacklist and a whitelist as in the EDoS-Shield technique. The EDoS-
Shield generates an overhead on the VF to check the incoming traffic. In addition, the 
EDoS-Shield requires communication between the VF and the V-Node, which causes a 
degradation on the performance of the cloud computing environment. On the other hand, 
our proposed technique only redirects the requests to the EDoS Attack Defender in case 
of a suspicious mode. The EDoS-Shield classified the traffic based on the IP address, and 
that has many drawbacks such as blocking an entire NAT network if one of the public IP 
addresses is caught as an attacker and added to the blacklist. The EDoS Attack Defender 
does not classify the incoming traffic and it triggers only in case of high traffic. Similarly, 
the EDoS Attack Defender uses CAPTCHA to differentiate between legitimate users and 
automated attackers (Zombies) similar to what the EDoS-Shield does. 
In our work, we will conduct simulation experiments for the EDoS attacks and our 
proposed mitigation technique: EDoS Attack Defender. The simulation will evaluate the 
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EDoS Attack Defender performance and then compare these results with the EDoS-
Shield simulation results. 
We conducted different simulation experiments on our proposed mitigation technique to 
verify the effectiveness of the EDoS Attack Defender. In addition, the comparison 
between our proposed mitigation technique and the EDoS-Shield will verify its 
effectiveness. 
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4 CHAPTER 4 
SIMULATOR 
 
This chapter discusses the implementation of the simulation to evaluate the proposed 
mitigation technique. We also verify and validate our simulation by comparing the 
obtained results with the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique results [34].  
4.1 Simulator’s Design 
 The simulation is implemented using C# programming language. A user-friendly 
graphical user interface is used to monitor all simulations. A discrete-event simulation 
model is used. The simulation is strictly based on the guidelines given by the book of 
Law and Kelton and the simulation setup of the  EDoS-Shield mitigation technique paper 
[34], including the use of initial seeds that were ten million apart, and avoiding any 
overlapping in the random number streams during the simulation. As recommended in 
[52], PMMLCG (prime modulus multiplicative linear congruential generator) is used in 
the simulation for generating random numbers. The PMMLCG is an efficient generator 
and one of the most popular methods for generating random numbers [52]. 
Our simulation model has two types of events including the ARRIVAL and 
DEPARTURE events. An ARRIVAL event occurs when a new request arrives at the 
system. A DEPARTURE event occurs when a request is completely processed by the 
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system. The two events are generated independently such that each event has its own 
seed and random-number stream (See Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12 Simulation Model Flowchart 
 
A discrete-event simulation experiment was conducted to evaluate the performance of the 
cloud service under the EDoS attack in terms of key performance indicators including 
end-to-end response time, computing resources utilization, and throughput. Since the 
EDoS attack is mainly targeted towards the cloud adopter, we have also evaluated the 
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cost associated with the computing resources and bandwidth allocations at the cloud 
service side. 
In the simulation experiment, we have considered the same setup as that of the queuing 
model presented in Figure 13. The input to the simulation is a combination of aggregated 
traffic from different sources including the attackers’   traffic. We have considered the 
Poisson nature of the incoming traffic. We have assumed a fixed input rate of 400 
Request /sec representing the rate of the legitimate requests coming from clients and a 
variable input rate ranging from 400 Request/sec to 8000 Request/sec representing the 
rate of the attack traffic. 
We have assumed the parameters in the simulation experiments as follows. 
1. The capacity of an instance is of 100 requests per second. 
2. The number of initial running instances is 5 instances. 
3. The upper utilization threshold is of 80%. 
4. The scaling size is variable and it can be easily changed through the GUI of the 
simulation. 
5. The price of the small instance and the large instance is $0.115 and $0.46 per 
hour, respectively.   
6. The bandwidth price is of $0.01 per GB in/out data transferred. 
 
41 
 
 
Figure 13 Queuing model for EDoS attack against a cloud service [34] 
 
The Poisson arrival is assumed as DDoS attack [53], [54] since the DDoS attacks are the 
major source of EDoS attacks. Therefore, we have assumed that the attack traffic input to 
our simulation is Poisson arrival. 
 
4.1.1 Simulator’s Assumptions 
1. The cloud computing services have a well-planned initial capacity. 
2. The attacker cannot respond to the CAPTCHA. 
3. The legitimate users would respond to 90% of the CAPTCHA requests. 
4.2 Simulation Measures 
4.2.1 Response Time 
Since the response time is an important requirement in most of the SLAs, Table 3.1 
shows the measured response time considering M/M/s, M/M/1, and parallel M/M/1 
queues. It shows different response time measurements based on the input load. 
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Table 1 Response time Equations for different queuing model [55] 
 
 Approximated 
M/M/s 
M/M/1  with  S  M/M/1 each 
with  
Low load    
High load    
 
 
S is the number of instances, P is the service  time,  and  λ  is  the  arrival  rate. 
For calculating the end-to-end response time, we use the decomposition method. First, 
the network is divided into subsystems including the Load balancers, EDoS Attack 
Defender, and the web servers (Cloud Service). Then, for each individual subsystem, we 
get the average delay considering their related input and capacity. Finally, the end-to-end 
response time is calculated by aggregating all the delays along paths from the source 
(clients) to the web server (Cloud Service) as a destination. Figure 14 below shows the 
considered subsystems and paths from the sources to the target cloud service. 
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Figure 14 Traffic flow paths from sources to a destination 
The delay for Path1 is calculated by using the following equation: 
Mean Response Time = Delay of Load balancer + Dealy_link2 + Delay Cloud instances 
(web servers) 
The delay for Path2 is calculated by using the following equation: 
Mean Response Time = Delay of Load balancer + Dealy_link3 + Delay of EDoS 
Defender + Delay Cloud instances (web servers) 
We have ignored the delay encountered because of the link between the source (clients) 
and the load balancer since we focused on the performance of the mitigation technique 
that starts at the load balancer. 
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The end-to-end response time for the cloud instances (web servers) is calculated by 
estimating the waiting time in the queue for every request and adding the service time. 
The average Cloud instances delay for the requests is defined as: 
Cloud instances delay = (total delay time in queue / total requests) + service time.  
4.2.2 Computing Resources Utilization 
The CPU utilization is one of the main parameters of the auto-scaling conditions. The 
CPU utilization is being used in our proposed mitigation technique to prove the 
mitigation concept. However, we could use the link utilization or other auto-scaling 
parameters by simply making small changes such as altering the thresholds. 
Assuming that all the computing instances have the same capacity of 
computing power, Pi=P, and the arrival rate at each instance is , the mean 
computing utilization U is calculated as follows: 
 
 
However, the CPU utilization of every instance in the simulation is calculated by 
aggregating the instance busy period divided by the total time of simulation. The CPU 
utilization of the running instances is calculated by taking the average of all running 
instances. 
 
P
OP
O
SS
SU
S
i
i
  
¦
Si OO  
45 
 
4.2.3 Throughput 
The throughput of the cloud system is calculated using Little’s  formula.  The  throughput  
of M/M/1 queuing system is   SS OPOPUP  u u , where P  is the service rate and 
U is the utilization for computing resources. Therefore, the average throughput for all 
instances isO . 
Similarly, the average throughput is calculated by multiplying the utilization of every 
instance calculated earlier by the arrival rate for every instance and then dividing by the 
total number of instances.  
4.2.4 Cost 
Several pricing models can be used by the cloud computing systems. Many service 
providers and cloud adopters   provide   the   flexibility   to   optimize   the   customers’   costs.  
Amazon EC2 provides customers with three different purchasing models that give them 
the flexibility to optimize their costs. On-Demand Instances allow customers to pay a 
fixed rate by the hour with no commitment. For the Reserved Instances model, customers 
pay a low, one-time fee and in turn receive a significant discount on the hourly charge for 
that instance. The Spot Instances model enables customers to bid whatever price they 
want for instance capacity, resulting in even greater savings if their applications have 
flexible start and end times. 
A Cloud user has to pay for the computing resources, the network traffic volume, and for 
the storage service, if required. In our work, we consider the cost related to both 
computing usage and bandwidth usage. 
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The cost has been calculated based on the following equation as used by Amazon [56]. 
Cost of bandwidth = bandwidth price for GB × arrival rate measured in GB/s × Time 
Cost of instances = instances price × the number of running instances × the average 
utilization running instances × Time 
Total cost = Cost of bandwidth + Cost of instances 
The cost of an instance is set to $0.115 as it is recently reported in Amazon for small on-
demand instances running on the Windows operating system [56]. Regarding the cost 
associated with the bandwidth allocation, we have used a base price of  $0.01 per GB 
in/out data transferred based on the reported prices of Internet data transfer "in" and "out" 
of Amazon EC2 [56]. 
4.3 Simulator’s Validation 
The simulation is validated by comparing obtained simulation results with the EDoS-
Shield simulation results for similar scenarios. In the first scenario, the EDoS-Shield 
work has considered different attack rates to show the impact of the attack on the targeted 
cloud service. The second scenario is for the optimal case where there is no attack 
targeting the cloud service. Each of the following subsections will discuss and compare 
the results obtained with the results presented in the EDoS-Shield work [34], [35]. In 
every scenario, we used different number of instances based on the attack rates. The 
number of instances is 6+5k, k= [0-20] based on the EDoS-Shield work [34], [35]. The 
EDoS-Shield work proposed the following equation to calculate the required instances: 
»¼
»
«¬
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Where requiredS  is the required instances, P  is the utilization,  is the EDoS attack rate, 
and  is the legitimate traffic rate. 
The number of instances is displayed in every graph. 
4.3.1 Response Time 
Figure 15 shows the comparison of the two results, the EDoS shield work and our 
implemented simulation. It is clear from the graph that both simulations have similar 
results for the response time with small differences due the randomness of the simulation. 
 
Figure 15 simulation results for EDoS Shield and our simulations, Response Time 
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4.3.2 Computing Resources Utilization 
For the computing resources utilization, the outputs are identical as shown in Figure 16 
 
Figure 16 simulation results for EDoS Shield and our simulations, Utilization 
 
4.3.3 Cost 
Figure 17 shows the computing resources and bandwidth cost for EDoS shield 
simulation. Our cost results are identical to the EDoS shield simulation results. 
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Figure 17 simulation results for EDoS Shield and our simulations, Cost  
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5 CHAPTER 5 
SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents the simulation results for the proposed mitigation technique. We 
have conducted three experimental scenarios using the simulation model discussed in the 
previous chapter. In the first scenario, we have considered different arrival rates to show 
the overhead (if any) of the proposed mitigation technique. The second scenario is for the 
flash crowd mode where there is high traffic coming to the cloud service. In the third 
scenario, we have considered different attack rates to show the effectiveness of our 
proposed mitigation technique. In addition, the output of the proposed mitigation 
technique is compared with the EDoS-Shield simulation results in the attack mode. 
5.1 Normal Mode Results 
In this scenario, we used different legitimate arrival rates ranging from 400 to 8000 
requests/second to state the overhead (if any) of the proposed mitigation technique. We 
used different number of instances based on the legitimate arrival rates. The number of 
instances is 8 + 6k, k= [0-19]. This selection of the number of instances is based on the 
EDoS-Shield work [34], [35]. The EDoS-Shield work proposed the calculation of the 
required instances to achieve 80% utilization under the EDoS attack. In the Normal and 
Flash Crowd modes, we calculated the required instances to achieve 66% utilization to 
examine the system under normal activity. The number of instances is displayed in every 
graph. In this scenario, there is no attack targeting the cloud services.  
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5.1.1 Response Time Evaluation 
Figure 18 shows the response time for the implemented mitigation technique: EDoS-
Defender in the normal mode. It is compared with the response time without a mitigation 
technique. The results are identical because no overhead or extra processing is required 
by the EDoS-Defender. 
 
Figure 18 Response Time evaluation Normal Mode 
 
5.1.2 Resources Utilization Evaluation 
Figure 19 shows the resources utilization for the implemented mitigation technique: 
EDoS-Defender in the normal mode for different arrival rates. It is compared with 
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resources utilization with and without a mitigation technique. The results are identical 
because no overhead or extra processing is required by the EDoS-Defender. 
 
Figure 19 Resources Utilization evaluation Normal Mode 
 
5.1.3 Cost Evaluation 
Figure 20 shows the Cost evaluation for the implemented mitigation technique: EDoS-
Defender in the normal mode for different arrival rates. It shows a comparison with the 
cost of resources without a mitigation technique. In the EDoS-Defender, the cost is a little 
bit higher because of the addition of the price of the large instance that is used as an 
EDoS-Defender instance. 
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Figure 20 Cost evaluation Normal Mode 
 
5.1.4 Throughput Evaluation 
Figure 21 shows the throughput evaluation for the implemented mitigation technique: 
EDoS-Defender in the normal mode for different arrival rates. It is compared with the 
throughput of resources without a mitigation technique. The results are identical because 
the EDoS Attack Defender will not affect the throughput rate. 
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Figure 21 Throughput evaluation Normal Mode 
 
5.2 Flash Crowd Mode Results 
In this scenario, we used different legitimate arrival rates ranging from 400 to 8000 
requests/second to state the overhead (if any) of the proposed mitigation technique. This 
mode will occur only if there is a legitimate high traffic (Flash crowd). The system will 
be in suspicious mode if the utilization is in the validation window, i.e., 70% to 80%. In 
this case, the cloud service will redirect all incoming requests to the EDoS Defender for a 
validation period. In this validation period, the EDoS defender will send a CAPTCHA to 
the clients to differentiate between Flash Crowd mode and Attack mode. In this scenario, 
there is no attack targeting the cloud services. In every scenario, we used a fixed number 
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of instances that is five instances, and then let the system auto-scale as. This auto-scaling 
is based on three instances per scaling up event. The number of instances is displayed in 
every graph. 
5.2.1 Response Time Evaluation 
Figure 22 shows the response time for the implemented mitigation technique: EDoS-
Defender in the Flash Crowd mode. It is compared with the response time without a 
mitigation technique. There is a little difference because of the CAPTCHA that is sent 
during the validation period from the EDoS-Defender to the legitimate users. This 
validation period is triggered to differentiate between Flash Crowd mode and Attack 
mode.  
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Figure 22 Response Time evaluation Flash Crowd Mode 
 
5.2.2 Resources Utilization Evaluation 
Figure 23 shows the resources utilization for the implemented mitigation technique: 
EDoS-Defender in the Flash Crowd mode. It is compared with resources utilization 
without a mitigation technique. The results are identical because the cloud service 
utilization is not affected by our proposed EDoS Defender mitigation technique since 
there are no attacks in this mode. 
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Figure 23 Resources Utilization evaluation Flash Crowd Mode 
 
5.2.3 Cost Evaluation 
Figure 24 shows the Cost evaluation for the implemented mitigation technique: EDoS-
Defender in the Flash Crowd mode for different legitimate arrival rates. It is compared 
with the cost of resources without a mitigation technique. In the EDoS-Defender, the cost 
is a little bit higher because of the addition of the price of the large instance that is used 
as an EDoS-Defender instance.  
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Figure 24 Cost evaluation Flash Crowd Mode 
 
5.2.4 Throughput Evaluation 
Figure 25 shows the throughput evaluation for the implemented mitigation technique: 
EDoS-Defender in the Flash Crowd mode for different legitimate arrival rates. It is 
compared with the throughput of resources without a mitigation technique. The results 
are identical because the EDoS Attack Defender will not affect the Throughput rate. 
 
59 
 
 
Figure 25 Throughput evaluation Flash Crowd Mode 
 
 
 
5.3 Attack Mode Results and EDoS Shield Comparison 
In this scenario, we used different attack rates ranging from 400 to 8000 requests/second 
to evaluate the proposed mitigation technique: EDoS-Defender under the EDoS attack. 
The arrival rate is assumed to follow the Poisson distribution. This mode will occur only 
if there is some attack traffic. The system will be in suspicious mode if the current system 
utilization is in the range of suspicion mode thresholds, i.e., 70%-80%. In this case, the 
cloud service will redirect all incoming requests to the EDoS Defender for a validation 
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period. In this validation period, the EDoS defender will send a CAPTCHA to the clients 
to differentiate between Flash Crowd mode and Attack mode. If the clients failed to 
respond to the CAPTCHA in this validation period, then it is considered as Attack mode. 
In this section, we compare the EDoS-Defender results with the results for the EDoS 
attack without a mitigation technique, the EDoS-Shield optimal case, the EDoS-Shield 
whitelist case, and the EDoS-Shield blacklist case. The EDoS-Shield optimal case refers 
to the EDoS-Shield when there is no spoofing IP address, i.e., all   legitimate  clients’   IP  
addresses are in the whitelist and all attacker IP addresses are in the blacklist. The EDoS-
Shield whitelist case refers to when the attacker spoofed an IP address that is already in 
the whitelist. In addition, this can occur when the attacker compromises machines behind 
a NAT, for which the exposed public IP addresses are already in the whitelist. Therefore, 
the EDoS-Shield will consider these attackers as legitimate clients. The EDoS-Shield 
blacklist case is used to describe the EDoS-Shield when an attacker successfully carries 
out IP address spoofing. This IP address was not used before to access the cloud services 
and as result, the IP is added to the blacklist. Therefore, the legitimate clients cannot 
access the cloud service because their IP addresses are already in the blacklist. Also, the 
attacker could compromise machines that are behind NAT protocol and add their public 
IP addresses to the blacklist, thus preventing the legitimate users from accessing the 
cloud services with these public IP addresses. Therefore, the EDoS-Shield will consider 
these legitimate clients as attackers. The EDoS-Shield blacklist case results are not shown 
in the following figures because all requests will be dropped and treated as attack 
requests. 
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5.3.1 Response Time Evaluation 
Figure 26 shows the response time for the implemented mitigation technique: EDoS-
Defender in the Attack mode. It is compared with the response time for the EDoS attack 
without a mitigation technique, the EDoS-Shield optimal case, and the EDoS-Shield 
whitelist case. The EDoS-Shield optimal case shows good results in comparison with the 
EDoS-Defender. The EDoS-Shield whitelist case shows results similar to the results of 
the case without a mitigation technique. The response time of the EDoS-Defender under 
attack starts with a low response time when the attack rate is 400 requests/sec and 400 
legitimate requests/sec, because a high number of legitimate users have to answer the 
CAPTCHA during the validation window. The response time of the EDoS-Defender 
increases when the attack rates increase because of higher attack rates. 
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Figure 26 Response Time evaluation Attack Mode 
 
 
5.3.2 Resources Utilization Evaluation 
Figure 27 shows the resource utilization for the implemented mitigation technique: 
EDoS-Defender in the Attack mode. It is compared with resource utilization for the 
EDoS attack without a mitigation technique, the EDoS-Shield optimal case, and the 
EDoS-Shield whitelist case. The EDoS-Shield optimal case shows identical results in 
comparison with the EDoS-Defender, in which all attack traffic will be blocked. The 
EDoS-Shield whitelist case shows results similar to the results of the case without a 
mitigation technique. The  EDoS  Attack  Defender’s  results  are  close  to  the  optimal  case. 
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Figure 27 Resources Utilization evaluation Attack Mode 
 
5.3.3 Cost Evaluation 
Figure 28 shows the cost evaluation for the implemented mitigation technique: EDoS-
Defender in the Attack mode. It is compared with the cost evaluation for the EDoS attack 
without a mitigation technique, and the EDoS-Shield optimal case. The EDoS-Defender 
shows the best cost evaluation because it uses only one large instance for the EDoS-
Defender. However, the EDoS-Shield uses two large instances for the Virtual Firewall 
(VF) and one small instance for the Verifier Node (V-Node). 
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Figure 28 Cost evaluation Attack Mode 
 
5.3.4 Throughput Evaluation 
Figure 29 shows the throughput of the legitimate requests for the implemented mitigation 
technique: EDoS-Defender in the Attack mode. It is compared with the throughput of the 
legitimate requests for the EDoS attack without a mitigation technique, the EDoS-Shield 
optimal case, and the EDoS-Shield whitelist case. Regarding the throughput evaluation, it 
is expected that the throughput of the legitimate requests will not be affected by the 
attack rate even without applying the mitigation technique. This is because the targeted 
cloud service is an on-demand cloud–based. According to the nature of the cloud 
computing system, i.e., scalability nature, we are assuming that there are enough on-
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demand cloud resources to be provisioned to the cloud instances executing the service. 
As a result, there is no degradation of the throughput rate of the legitimate requests in all 
scenarios. 
 
Figure 29 Throughput evaluation Attack Mode 
 
5.4 Detailed Results 
In this scenario, we used different results representation to show the effect of the EDoS 
Attack Defender using different parameters such as utilization versus the simulation time 
to see how the system behaves at different stages of the simulation time. 
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5.4.1 Resources Utilization Evaluation 
Figure 30 shows the resources utilization for the implemented mitigation technique: 
EDoS-Defender in the Attack mode with 8000 requests attack rate and 400 requests 
legitimate rate. The system has 9 instances. At the beginning of the attack, the utilization 
rises to almost 100% because of the high attack rate. However, this increase is 
instantaneous so the auto-scaling feature is not triggered but the EDoS Attack Defender is 
triggered and investigates the traffic and keeps sending the Graphic Turing Test 
(CAPTCHA) to all new incoming requests including the legitimate and the attacker 
requests. The attacker will not respond to the CAPTCHA so all attack requests are 
dropped and the utilization is dropped as well to the baseline utilization, which is in this 
case 45%. Then, the EDoS Attack Defender uses the Attack Period Timer to detect if the 
attack has finished. The EDoS Attack Defender checks the percentage of legitimate 
responses to the Graphic Turing Test (CAPTCHA) every time the Attack Period Timer 
runs out. If the percentage is greater than 90%, then the attack has finished and the 
current mode will change to Normal Mode. Otherwise, the attack has not finished and the 
EDoS Attack Defender keeps sending CAPTCHA to all new incoming requests. 
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Figure 30 Resources Utilization evaluation Attack Mode 
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5.4.2 Response Time Evaluation Including Load Balancer Delay 
In this scenario, we included the load balancer delay and link delay in the end-to-end 
response time result. Liu and Wee [57] reported that an Amazon EC2 instance can handle 
800 Mbps when used as a load balancer. ”Because the load balancer does not process the 
traffic, but rather, only forwards the packets, we expect the results to hold for other web 
applications.” [57] . We assume requests with an average size of 580 bytes [58], by 
simple calculations, )10800()8580( 6uu , the average processing time (forwarding time) 
for a request in the load balancer is about 5.8 µs or less. Therefore, we use a load 
balancer instance with 5.8 µs service time in our experiments. Thorsten Von Eicken [59] 
proposed a benchmark for the load balancer on the amazon cloud environment. This test 
includes different existing load balancers such as HAproxy, Zeus, aiCache, and Amazon's 
Elastic Load Balancing service. They focused on how many requests per second the load 
balancer is able to handle. The result shows that Amazon Elastic load balancer could 
process more than 20k requests per second. The capacity of the links in the cloud 
infrastructure is set to 10 Gbps so as to calculate the delay regarding the link, (580 u  8) / 
(10 u  109). The link delay is approximately equal to 0.464 µs. 
 Figure 31 shows the response time for the implemented mitigation technique: EDoS-
Defender in the Attack mode with the load balancer delay and the link delay.  
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Figure 31 Response Time with Load Balancer Delay evaluation Attack Mode 
 
5.4.3 Response Time Evaluation in Flash Crowd  
In this scenario, we used five instances with a scaled up parameter instead of three 
instances. Figure 32 shows an improvement in the response time with a higher auto-
scaling size. However, with higher auto-scaling size, we could allocate unnecessary 
instances that will increase the cost. 
Therefore, in this thesis, the auto-scaling size is set to three and it gives reasonable CPU 
utilization and response time. 
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Figure 32 Response Time using five instances for scaling up Flash Crowd Mode 
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6 CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter summarizes the major contribution and findings in this thesis. The main 
objective of this research is to design and implement a mitigation technique capable of 
preventing or mitigating the impact of the Economic Denial of Suitability (EDoS) attack 
on the cloud computing environment. In addition, this chapter states the limitations of the 
proposed work with possible improvements as future work. 
6.1 Conclusion 
Cloud computing is a promising technology. However, the security of cloud computing 
must be investigated deeply. EDoS attack is one of the major threats targeted towards the 
cloud computing environments, and which needs to be considered. In this thesis, a novel 
solution is presented to mitigate or prevent such attacks. The mitigation technique, 
namely EDoS Attack Defender, is based on reactive mitigation schemes. It is only 
triggered when there is suspicious traffic coming to the cloud platform. Therefore, all 
incoming traffic is directed to the EDoS Attack Defender instance for investigation and to 
validate that the traffic intensity does not exceed a defined threshold. The EDoS Attack 
Defender uses the Graphic Turing Test such as CAPTCHA to differentiate between 
legitimate and attack traffic. The performance measures show the effectiveness of our 
proposed mitigation technique. In addition, we compare our proposed mitigation 
technique with the EDoS-Shield in three cases, the optimal case, the whitelist case, the 
blacklist case. The comparison results show that our proposed mitigation technique is 
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better than the EDoS-Shield in the whitelist case and the blacklist case in terms of 
performance metrics. In the whitelist case, the EDoS-Shield could still allow some 
attackers to launch the EDoS attack.  And, in the blacklist case, the EDoS-Shield could 
still block some legitimate users and prevent them from using the cloud services. The 
comparison results between the EDoS-Shield in the optimal case and our proposed 
mitigation technique show that the EDoS Defender is better in terms of cost by 44.3% 
and the EDoS-Shield is better in terms of response time by 8.80% in the worst case (8000 
attack requests/second). However, the EDoS Defender will not block or prevent any 
legitimate users from the cloud services or allow any attackers to achieve their objective 
by launching an EDoS attack. Overall, the proposed mitigation technique shows 
promising results. 
6.2 Future Work  
The future work improvements will look into the following three aspects: 
1. Using a smarter method to detect if the attack has finished, and considering the 
down-scaling feature under the attack. The first improvement will consider better 
ways to detect if the attack has finished, rather than using the Attack Period 
Timer. The second improvement will consider different types of attacks other than 
the DDoS attacks that could lead to EDoS attacks. The third improvement will 
consider the down-scaling feature while the attack is undergoing and will run 
some scenarios to confirm if the EDoS Attack Defender will take care of such a 
scenario or whether it needs further improvement. 
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2. To enhance the simulation, we could add different distributions of the attack and 
simulate different types of cloud services. 
3. In addition, one of the future directions for this work is to conduct experimental 
implementation of the proposed mitigation technique using a test bed of a private 
or public cloud and compare the obtained results with our simulation results.  
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